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This paper underlies some of the propositions in “Globalisation and Institutional
Change: A Development Perspective”, which I presented at the General Assembly of the
Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, The Vatican, on “Globalization and the Common
Humanity: Ethical and Institutional Concerns”, 25-28 April 2001. Like its companion, it
contributes to the activity on “Empowering people to take advantage of globalisation”
included in the programme of work of the OECD Development Centre for the years 2001-
2002.
The policy recommendations emerging from the 1999-2000 programme of work of
the OECD Development Centre already indicated that sustainable development in a
globalising economy requires good governance, both at the international and national
levels. Without appropriate governance structures, developing countries will find it
difficult to participate in and to benefit from the process of globalisation while ensuring a
fair distribution of these benefits among the different segments of their populations.
Securing a positive interaction between globalisation and governance is even
more challenging in developing countries seeking to alleviate poverty. In effect, a
development-inducing interaction may require deeper institutional change than
policymakers and citizens can deliver. This is why, from a development perspective,
governance issues are inseparable from ways and means to promote institutional
reforms. In this regard, the pressure of globalisation appears to be greatest on reforms
leading to more foreign trade in goods, services and assets than on reforms impinging on
other aspects of the national economic and social structure - which may be of greater
relevance to citizens.
It is this differentiated pressure from markets and voters that must be resolved for
a positive interaction to obtain. When the interaction is negative, on the contrary,
demands from international financial institutions bring about social unrest, which in turn
stalls structural adjustment and institutional reform. As a consequence of this
fundamental ambiguity, national policy makers may be tempted to retract on international
exchange when structural reforms face greater resistance from citizens. Yet, the
temptation to delay reforms cannot be overcome through defensive measures against
globalisation. Rather an improvement in governance bringing about institutional change
is the dominant strategy.
Demonstrating a positive causal effect of globalisation on governance is not
sufficient for a positive interaction to obtain, but it is a necessary first step. The result
obtained in this paper from a cross-section of 119 countries over the periods 1984-88
and 1990-98 is precisely that the effect of import openness on corruption is one third that
of income per capita. The effect of import openness on the index of apparent corruptionCD/DOC(2001)13
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is supposed to reflect good governance and the effect of the level of income and of
corruption is controlled by using instrumental variables related to physical remoteness
and cultural characteristics. Those results extend to financial openness and are robust to
the introduction of cultural variables, including “OECD membership”.
Building on this result I suggest both national and regional governance responses
to globalisation in “Globalisation and Institutional Change” which would contribute to
bringing about sustained national development. The national response that is
emphasised involves fighting against corruption, whereas regional integration is seen as
a way of introducing peer pressure for better policies. This implies going beyond the
trade agenda into deeper issues of policy reform. The question would then become
whether peer pressure at the regional level can bring about national institutions
responsive to global challenges. Answering this question is more likely to provide policy
makers with a handle on how to bring about the positive interaction, rather than simply
liberalising their economic regimes in the hope that the appropriate institutional change
will materialise.






Des relations d’interdépendance d’une grande complexité lient ensemble la
globalisation, la gouvernance et les performances économiques. Ce Document
technique examine une hypothèse claire et précise : « la globalisation a-t-elle un effet
direct sur la gouvernance  ?  ». Pour tester cette hypothèse, ou plus précisément la
manière dont l’ouverture joue sur la qualité des institutions nationales, les auteurs
passent en revue quelques explications théoriques des relations de causalité entre
globalisation et gouvernance. D’après la théorie micro-économique, la politique
commerciale, la concurrence des producteurs étrangers et des investisseurs
internationaux, ainsi que les différences liées au degré d’ouverture dans les coûts et
avantages du développement institutionnel, sont trois des principaux mécanismes par
lesquels l’ouverture exerce une influence sur le niveau de corruption d’un pays. Après
examen d’un vaste échantillon de pays sur une période de 20 ans, nous trouvons des
données empiriques solides à l ’appui du fait que toute ouverture aux importations
s’accompagne de fait d’un recul de la corruption, ce qui constitue un volet fondamental
de la gouvernance. L’ampleur de cet effet est également importante  : après avoir
neutralisé les nombreuses spécificités nationales, il ressort que l’influence de l’ouverture
sur la corruption atteint près du tiers du niveau obtenu par le degré de développement.
Les auteurs en déduisent quelques conclusions pour l’orientation des politiques.
ABSTRACT
Globalisation, governance and economic performance affect each other in very complex
mutual relationships. In this paper, we establish a clear and well-circumscribed
hypothesis: “is there an effect of globalisation on governance?” To test this hypothesis
or, even more specifically, to test how openness can affect the quality of domestic
institutions, we survey available theoretical explanations of causal relationships between
globalisation and governance. Microeconomic theory helps us identify trade policy,
competition by foreign producers and international investors, and openness-related
differences in institution building costs and benefits, as three major transmission
mechanisms through which openness affects a country’s corruption levels. Examining a
large sample of countries covering a 20-year long period, we found robust empirical
support for the fact that increases in import openness do indeed cause reductions in
corruption, a crucial aspect of governance. The magnitude of the effect is also quite
strong. After controlling for many cross-country differences, openness’ influence on
corruption is close to one third of that exercised by the level of development. Some
cautious policy conclusions are derived.CD/DOC(2001)13
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Globalisation, governance and economic performance affect each other in very
complex mutual relationships. The issue on how state and market, or globalisation and
governance, should be combined and whether institutional arrangements should be
uniform across countries or wide local variations should be encouraged are still
contentiously discussed and this paper contributes constructively to this debate. In
particular, it tries establishing whether there is an effect of globalisation on governance
and, even more specifically, to test how openness can affect the quality of domestic
institutions. By investigating how globalisation influences governance, this paper offers
some interesting new evidence on a particular but potentially quite valuable dimension of
their complex relationships. More specifically, it attempts to understand why increased
openness and international integration should affect the quality of domestic institutions,
and tries to measure by how much.
To do so, a survey of the available theoretical explanations of causal relationships
between globalisation and governance identifies trade policy, competition by foreign
producers and international investors, and openness-related differences in institution
building costs and benefits, as three major transmission mechanisms through which
openness affects a country’s corruption levels.
This paper extends the existing literature in three respects. First, the effect of
openness on corruption is estimated considering a larger sample of countries over a 20-
year long period and using two different measures of corruption as robustness check.
Second, a wide set of controls is used to test for various theories on the causes of
corruption and their potential influence over the openness-corruption relationship. Third,
the possibility of reverse causality is accurately tested using appropriate tests and
estimation techniques.
Robust empirical support is found for the fact that increases in openness do
indeed cause reductions in corruption. The magnitude of the effect is also quite strong.
After controlling for many cross-country differences, openness’ influence on corruption is
close to one third of that exercised by the level of development.
Confirming available results in the literature, a detectable significant direct effect
from trade policy is not measured; however reducing trade barriers may still bring
positive corruption reductions in the long run. More open economies, enjoying more
foreign competition and investing abundantly in institution building, will normally register
lower corruption levels.
The issue of reverse causality —  a corrupt bureaucracy may induce a lower
degree of international integration by erecting discretionary barriers — is dealt with andCD/DOC(2001)13
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the paper provides empirical evidence proving that openness does independently
influence corruption and not vice versa.
The paper is organised into five sections: an introduction is followed by a section
discussing some stylised facts about the globalisation and governance nexus and
emphasising some of the major difficulties researchers encounter in studying this
subject; it also briefly reviews theories on the potential channels through which openness
may influence governance’ quality. Sections III and IV present our empirical assessment
of the strength of these links. A final section concludes by summarising main findings
and pointing out potential policy implications.
JEL Classification:
D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures,
and Voting Behaviour
D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organisations
F19 - Trade, Other
K42 - Illegal Behaviour and the Enforcement of Law
Keywords: Corruption, globalisation, governance, international trade.CD/DOC(2001)13
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I. INTRODUCTION
Globalisation and governance (G&G) affect each other and economic
performance in very complex mutual relationships, nor least because of severe
measurement difficulties. How much and which type of foreign capital should be allowed
to enter or to exit a particular economy? How important is it to participate in multilateral
trade negotiations or to join a regional trade area? How could local institutions respond to
global challenges or be affected by them? These are some of the grand questions
motivating a companion paper (Braga de Macedo, 2001). Far from answering all of them,
we try here to establish whether there is an effect of globalisation on governance and,
even more specifically, to test how openness can affect the quality of domestic
institutions. To do so, we survey available theoretical explanations of causal relationships
between globalisation and governance. In the last 20 years or so, economists have
changed their views on these relationships more than once. At the time of the fall of the
Berlin Wall and after the disillusions of the inward looking economic policies of many
developing regions in the world, the shared view was that liberal democracy had
triumphed worldwide, Communism was over, and the advent of true global economic
progress would be brought by free markets and minimal states. A “Washington Consensus”
based on these ideas had emerged. Again, a few years later, innovative and cheaply
available communication possibilities and the ensuing new economy revolution reinforced
the view that the market and its globalising forces would bring huge benefits for all.
However, the main problem of this Washington Consensus is that, even after
repeated attempts, it has not really delivered a “Moscow Success”, nor a “Latin American
Miracle”. Indeed, even the East Asian one, which superficially looked like a diligent
application of the Washington paradigm, had recently to sail through stormy waters. Due
to these setbacks and their own scepticism for the standard recommendations,
economists have reconsidered the important role of public intervention in fostering the
20-year long East Tigers’ booming phase; they have contrasted the recent mediocre
growth performance of regions following orthodox recommendations, such as Latin
America and Eastern-Europe, with the success cases of China, India and others that
joined the global economy in an unorthodox — gradual, sequential and still partial —
manner; and many are persuaded that effective states as well as efficient markets are
both crucial ingredients for a successful human society. The issue on how state and
market,  yet another manifestation of G&G, should be combined and whether institutional
arrangements should be uniform across countries or wide local variations should be
encouraged are still contentiously debated among international financial institutions
1.
By investigating how globalisation influences governance, this paper offers some
interesting new evidence on a particular but potentially quite valuable dimension of their
complex relationships. More specifically, we attempt to understand why increased
openness and international integration should affect the quality of domestic institutions,
and try to measure by how much.CD/DOC(2001)13
12
II. GLOBALISATION AND GOVERNANCE (G&G):
FROM STYLISED FACTS TO THEORY
II.1 Stylised Facts
Figure 1 summarises links operating at national level between G&G and economic
performance. The top panel shows how a nation’s resource endowments and its
productivity determine how fast it can grow and the level of its economic well being in
terms of income per capita (arrows 1 and 2). Feedbacks are possible: a richer country
growing fast may invest more resources in scientific research and technology
development and thus enjoy higher productivity levels than a poorer, slow-growing
economy; this explains why arrow 1 is double-sided.
The bottom panel shows that, through trade, capital flows or migration,
globalisation can influence the level of endowments available in an economy, or even,
through international technology transfers, its productivity. Conversely a country's
endowments of natural resources, labour, and capital, as well as its geographic location
and efficiency of its production structures may determine how much it trades with the rest
of the world (arrows 3, which, like arrows 1, 2 have always been at the core of economic
thought).
Similarly, a country with a good governance, namely a democratic state with high-
quality institutions, effective corruption-free accountable bureaucracies, and a flourishing
civil society may likely increase the quality, if not the quantity, of its most important
endowment: its own people. Once more, cause and effect can be swapped: well-
endowed countries may evolve towards democratic forms of government more easily, or,
at least, they may afford investing more resources to build well-functioning institutions
(arrow 4).CD/DOC(2001)13
13
Figure 1. G&G Links to National Economic Performance
Economic Performance:







Recently new attention has been drawn towards arrow 5 and “how G&G interact to
affect economic performance” has become a topical question and the focus of the
analysis of this paper. Some interesting empirical stylised facts about arrow 5 have been
highlighted in the literature. A clear pattern, for instance, linking government size and
level of development has been identified long ago: richer economies on average display
larger governments. Honouring a nineteen-century German economist who first noticed
it, this pattern takes his name: “Wagner’s Law”. Based more on historical observations
than basic economic principles inference, Wagner (1883) formulated a simple theory in
which public expenditure growth was seen as a natural consequence of economic
development. A very large literature followed and the validity of Wagner Law has
survived recurrent scrutiny
2. A second empirical regularity is observed when government
spending is measured across countries grouped according to their level of trade
openness: countries trading more intensively have larger governments. It seems as if
countries heavily relying on global markets tend to compensate the ensuing risks they
take with a bigger public sector. In fact, this is exactly the theory advanced by Rodrik
(1998) who constructs a model where government size provides an indirect insurance
against risks originating from global markets. By employing more people or through their
social safety nets, large governments partially insulate their citizens from global markets
fluctuations. Although contending theories may explain the size of the public sector, the
simplicity of this model is appealing and its predictions are validated by empirical tests.
Finally, another important relation is registered between GDP growth rates and trade
openness: it seems that more open countries grow faster. The links between trade
openness and growth are, however, much more complex and the debate among those
who support globalisation as a positive growth factor and those who are more sceptical is
not yet settled
3.
Interestingly, if size of government expenditure is substituted for an index of the
quality of the bureaucracy or for an index of perceived corruption, the above relationships
are confirmed; once more, richer and more open countries display lower levels of
perceived corruption, and hence better governance
4.
In sum, one may be tempted to conclude that richer countries, as opposed to
poorer, have a tendency to be more open to international trade and to have a larger andCD/DOC(2001)13
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better public sector; or, in other words, that successful economies are able to combine
the right mixes of market and state, of globalisation and governance. However, these
stylised facts point to broad connections with no indication of causality and, more
fundamentally, they do not provide any clue on how, or why, the right combination of
globalisation and governance could be achieved.
Causality is one of the fundamental problem social scientists have to face when
studying the relationship between economic performance, institutions and global
markets. On the one hand, many papers document how high-quality institutions foster
economic growth; on the other hand, evidence is accumulating on how developed
countries may afford better institutions
5. Complexity is the other fundamental problem.
The relationships we mentioned above connect pairs of variables, however their links
may be caused by the influence of other variables. Economic development, for instance,
may be at the origin of a spurious relationship between government size and openness
by simultaneously increasing the levels of both of them.
II.2. Theory
Explaining how globalisation affects governance and how it helps or hinders
economic development means to clearly identify causes and effects and to take into
account multiple factors. To do that we need to move from simple stylised facts to more
complex theories and empirical tests. In particular, the central question we attempt to
answer here is: why and by how much does openness influence the level of perceived
corruption in a given country? On the surface, no relationships seem to link openness
and corruption directly, and a brief digression on the theoretical determinants of
corruption is useful before considering our results.
Increased private gains are corruption’s main objective, however, among its
crucial causes, we find economic as well as cultural and social variables. In a recent
study, Treisman (2000) tests several hypotheses for the causes of corruption and offers
a quite informative ranking on several corruption determinants. Clearly corruption is
lower when its costs, including psychological and social, are higher than its benefits, and
he finds that, on average, this is the case for those countries with Protestant traditions,
those that are more developed and have higher quality governments. On the contrary,
corruption is more pervasive when the state is federal, its democratic basis has been
established only recently (less than 20 years), and, finally, when a country is less open to
trade. More succinctly and using Klitgaard’s words, corruption thrives when monopoly
power is combined with discretion and low accountability. Incentives to bribery do not
arise in a society where all economic activities are carried out in a perfect competition
setting with no single agent able to affect the price or the quantity of the product he sells
or buys. By the same token, corruption is reduced when economic rents do not depend
on the discretionary power of some public official, or when monopolistic economic
activities as well as governments are subject to strict rules of accountability.
Within this general framework, openness to international trade and capital flows
may alter the balance between corruption costs and benefits through at least three
mechanisms, which we now consider in turn.CD/DOC(2001)13
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Krueger illustrates the first mechanism in her 1974 article focusing on rent-seeking
activities caused by quantitative restrictions to imports. In contrast to tariffs, quotas, and
other official permissions to imports, generate considerable economic rents due to the
monopolistic power they grant to legal importers. In order to appropriate these rents,
agents may legally compete or embark in illegal rent-seeking activities such as bribery,
corruption, smuggling and black markets. Krueger proves that these rent-seeking
activities induce an economy to operate at a level below its optimal, generate a
divergence between private and social costs, and, thus, entail a welfare cost additional to
that due to tariff restrictions. In successive papers, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980) and
Bhagwati (1982), have generalised Krueger’s original idea to a whole array of Directly
Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) activities providing further arguments in favour of
trade liberalisation. More recently Gatti (1999) presents some empirical evidence of the
explicit link between restrictions to trade and capital flows and corruption. In fact, her
empirical study aims at disentangling two effects of inward-oriented policies on
corruption: the “direct policy distortion” and the “foreign competition effect”. High barriers
to international transactions directly encourage private agents to bribe public officials in
exchange for favouritism, the first distortion, and, through the second effect, reduce
competition between domestic and foreign firms so that margins for rent seeking, and
corruption, are kept high.
This second competition-reducing mechanism deserves some additional attention.
Ades and Di Tella (1999) provide evidence that the level of rents in general and market
structure in particular determine corruption intensity in an economy. Interestingly they
argue that changes in rents size due to variation in the degree of competition may have
ambiguous effects on corruption. On the one hand, larger rents resulting from a low
competition environment increase the amounts bureaucrats can extract as bribes; on the
other hand, in such a situation, it becomes more valuable to a society to increase the
monitoring and accountability of its bureaucracy (more on this below). Determining the
correct sign of the net effect on corruption due to these two opposing tendencies may be
theoretically important, however, looking at real world situations, one finds many
examples of positive connection between rents and corruption. A clear-cut case, cited by
the authors, is that of oil-exporting countries: Nigeria, where 1980s oil export generated
about 80 per cent of government revenues and spurred a construction and import boom
especially favouring the ruling party’s officials, provides a striking example of how rents
cause corruption. These observations provide sufficient justification for Ades and Di Tella
to build a model that links directly increased product market competition to lower rents
and to lower corruption levels. In their model three sets of variables determine corruption:
wages of the bureaucracy, the level of monitoring, and the level of profits that, in turn,
depend on the degree of competition. Bureaucracy wages and monitoring are indirectly
captured by a society’s level of economic development (GDP per capita, schooling) and
political development (respect of political rights, index in Gastil, 1982). Competition is
proxied by the share of imports in GDP, the sector-concentration of exports, and the
distance from the world’s major exporters. For the same level of the other variables,
countries less exposed to foreign imports, or with a large share of their exports due to
natural resources, should suffer higher levels of corruption than those countries more
integrated in world markets and with a differentiated export basis.CD/DOC(2001)13
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Wei (2000), by explicitly considering differences in the costs and benefits of
monitoring public officials due to the degree of international integration, advances a final
third mechanism linking globalisation to institutional quality. The basic idea is
straightforward: improving the quality of institutions and their capacity to fight corruption
depend on the amount of resources a society devotes to this end. A society invests more
into building good institutions the larger the benefits it receives or the smaller the costs.
Given that foreign producers may divert their exports or investments from a national
market to another more easily than domestic producers, one would expect corruption
and bad governance to discourage more strongly international trade and capital flows
than domestic commerce and investment. This differential effect of corruption induces
stronger incentives towards good governance investments for those economies that are
more open. Other things being equal and because of the resulting larger benefits, an
economy more exposed to international markets would allocate more resources to
fighting corruption and end up with a lower level of it than a more isolated inward-looking
one.
This model main result rests on two crucial assumptions. Firstly, corruption must
truly affect more severely international transactions than domestic ones. Wei provides
justification for this arguing that, thanks to their better opportunities to do business
elsewhere, foreigners enjoy stronger bargaining power vis-à-vis domestic agents.
Alternatively, enforcement costs for international contracts, already starting at a higher
level than those for domestic ones, increase more steeply with corruption.
The second crucial assumption is concerned with the direction of causality: for
Wei  ‘being open’ comes before and independently of corruption, it is not a result of
economic policy or business choices. In fact it may be useful to examine further this
general issue of causality for all the three openness-corruption links we have described.
In the Krueger model, trade policy is exogenous and causality goes from trade
barriers to corruption (or other rent-seeking activities) via a reduction of foreign
competition and the creation of artificial rents in import regulated activities.
In the Ades and Di Tella study, the degree of competition influences corruption,
but this, in turn, by reaching certain intolerable thresholds, can provide incentives to alter
the rules of competition. To overcome this circularity in their corruption regression, they
measure import openness, a crucial proxy variable for competition, as if this was
determined only by countries’ population and land sizes. The identifying assumption here
is that these variables affect corruption only through their effect on import openness, and
that they cannot be altered by corruption. For the other variables — natural resources
share in total exports or trade distance — the direction of causality does not present
problems.
Finally, Wei’s solution to the causality problem is to consider two types of
openness. The first, labelled natural openness, is the potential cause for corruption and
the second, residual openness, is the possible consequence of corruption. In his model,
natural openness is determined by geographical measures, such as a country’s distance
from major trading nations weighted by bilateral trade flows. In this way, corrupt official
erecting artificial trade barriers cannot alter this type of openness and will only affect
what Wei calls residual openness.CD/DOC(2001)13
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Our discussion on corruption determinants and causality issues is summarised in
Figure 2. The three blocks on the left side represents three different sets of variables and
the arrows depict the influences they exercise on corruption and among themselves.
Apart from cultural and social variables and geography, all the other factors considered
here can be affected by corruption, and this explains the double direction of the arrows.
Figure 2. Corruption Determinants
Cultural and Social Variables
Corruption
Economic Variables: Rents -





A complete model would take into account all this figure’s variables and arrows
and provide guidance on how to disentangle causality directions. However, as reported
above, economic theories of corruption have not yet reached this ideal stage and we
have to adopt several simplifying assumptions. In particular, in our empirical assessment,
we introduce additional controls to avoid potential omitted variables bias: if, for instance,
we knew that ethnic fractionalisation is strongly correlated with trade openness and
determines low levels of corruption but is omitted from our regressions, then the positive
influence we would attribute to openness should in reality be assigned to ethnic
fractionalisation. Additionally, even if we consider economic policies as exogenous, we
take into account potential reverse causality from corruption to other relevant economic
variables and correct for this by using geographical determinants as instruments.CD/DOC(2001)13
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III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: MODEL SPECIFICATION AND DATA
The theories we briefly reviewed contribute to explain why openness has an effect
on corruption; this and the next sections test these theories on real world data and offer
an empirical assessment of how much openness influences corruption.
The reduced form equations derived from the models described in the previous
section as well as all our estimations can be represented by the following equation or by
some of its variations:
- CORRUPTit = β 0 + β 1 Opennessit + β 2 log (GDPit)+ β 3 PolRit + β 4 Otherit + β 5 EcPolit +ε it (1)
Our focus is on the sign and magnitude of β 1, the marginal effect of openness on
corruption; however, as suggested by the theory on the causes of corruption, we
introduce several additional explanatory variables. The level of development of a country,
by influencing cultural attitudes towards corruption and by affecting the amount of
resources that may be devoted to monitor public officials, is a key determinant of
corruption levels and enters our equation in terms of Gross Domestic Output per capita
(GDP).Similarly a country score on basic political rights (PolR) may be a good proxy for
its degree of accountability, another important factor explaining corruption. As shown
above in Figure 2 and to avoid omitted variables bias, a series of other variables taking
into account social and other causes for corruption is introduced in our empirical
estimation (the Other variables we used are briefly described below). Finally, we test
whether economic policy variables (EcPol), such as the degree of trade liberalisation or
more general state intervention in the economy, have a direct effect on corruption.
Among the Other variables group, exports’ sectoral concentration, trade
remoteness, country size and additional “cultural” traits are considered important
independent determinants of corruption. Natural resources abundant countries will
normally record sectorally concentrated exports, low degrees of competition, high rents,
and widespread corruption. Less geographically remote countries are ‘naturally’ more
open and need to invest more in institution building and are expected to show lower
levels of perceived corruption (Wei, 2000). Small countries could more easily manage an
efficient control over their territory and would therefore enjoy lower corruption. Finally,
certain important country characteristics such as their colonial past, religious tradition,
ethnic composition as well as their being a stable democracy have been frequently
considered by studies on corruption and we add them to our list of controls.
Among the variables included in equation (1), Openness and GDP, at least, may
suffer the problem of reverse causality; a corrupt bureaucracy may induce a lower
degree of international integration by erecting discretionary barriers or even slow downCD/DOC(2001)13
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the development process through excessive regulations and direct waste of resources. If
not corrected reverse causality can be a serious drawback altering not only the
magnitude of our β s
6 but also their meaning: instead of verifying whether openness or
GDP influence corruption we would be picking up how much corruption affect our
regressors. Endogeneity tests, described in the next section, have been carried out and
fortunately the gravity of this problem does not seem too dramatic; however we have
performed standard two stages least squares estimations to provide convincing evidence
that indeed openness exercises independent influence over perceived corruption effect.
The problems in the selection of the instruments used in the first stage and the results of
these estimations are detailed in the next section.
A brief description of the data we used in our equations concludes this section.
Quantitative studies of the determinants of corruption are relatively recent given that
numerical measures for corruption have not been ready available in the past. In this
study we use two subjective indices of corruption as our dependent variable. These
indices, produced for the use of international investors, are derived by standards
questionnaires subjected to large random polls so that, by construction, they facilitate
cross-country comparisons. In addition their commercial value partially guarantees their
accuracy. Objective indices would be preferable if they were measured consistently
across countries and were independent of corruption itself. Consider, for instance, a
measure such as reported fraud cases: its objective value may depend on country-
specific definitions and local corruption-fighting systems so that a country with a true low
level of corruption and efficient monitoring schemes may report more numerous fraud
cases than a more corrupt country. Corruption indices used here are those produced by
Transparency International (TI) and by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of
the PRS group. It should be noticed that we have rescaled these two indices to vary in a
continuous interval between 0 and 10, where 10 reflects the best score, i.e. the lowest
level for corruption. Given that these two indices cover different country samples and
time periods, we use both indices to test for robustness of our results. TI sample contains
yearly corruption data covering 53 countries for the period 1980-85, the same countries
for 1988-92, and 75 countries for 1995-98; ICRG sample includes 119 countries for the
three periods of 1984-88, 1990-94 and 1995-98. Instead of using yearly data, for both TI
and ICRG, we calculated three averages corresponding to the time intervals for which
corruption indices were available. Due to the fact that yearly estimates for all our
dependent variables and for all the countries covered by TI and ICRG do not exist, we
preferred to adopt this averages approach to fill the gaps rather than restrict the sample
to the few countries that present all the necessary data. In this way we maximise cross-
country variation sacrificing little time variation.
In equation (1), our initial measure for openness is given by the ratio of imports on
GDP. The other economic variables, namely GDP per capita, the share of natural
resources exports on total exports, government expenditure and consumption, and area
7
were collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Remoteness is a
weighted average of each country distance from its trading partners in which the weights
are given by the share of exports of the country’s partners in global exports. Formally it is
constructed in this way:CD/DOC(2001)13
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Remotenesskt = ∑i≠k wi log (distancek i) , where:  wi = exporti / ∑i≠k exporti (2)
In fact remoteness is a unilateral (not multilateral) measure of the distance of each
country from a sort of economic geographic centre determined by the largest exporters in
world trade. Political rights index —  varying between 0, worst score, and 10, best
score — was obtained from Freedom House, ethnic fractionalisation and protestant
traditions dummies were derived from La Porta et al. (1999), colonial past and
democracy dummies were taken from Paul Hensel website and Treisman (2001), trade
liberalisation index was kindly provided by the IMF, and geographical data (distances,
latitude, tropics dummy used to construct our instrumental variables) come from various
sources.
Table 7 in appendix presents summary statistics for the main variables used in our
regressions. The number of observations for the ICRG and TI groups reflects the largest
samples we were able to use in our most complete specification of equation (1), and it
does not necessarily equal the sum across periods of all the countries covered by the
corruption indices. Besides, the trade liberalisation index is only available for the 1995-98
time interval, and that explains the drop in the number of observation. A major difference
between the ICRG and TI samples consists of the latter’s exclusion of a fair share of
developing countries: this is noticeable in its higher mean for GDP per capita (TI’s GDP
average is almost 30 per cent higher than that of ICRG). The large dimension of our
samples provides significant cross-country and time variation, resulting in high quality
estimates of how globalisation improves governance, as claimed in the title.CD/DOC(2001)13
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IV. HOW GLOBALISATION IMPROVES GOVERNANCE
In this section, we present the main results of our empirical investigation on the
links between globalisation and governance, or, more precisely, between openness on
corruption. Simple correlations, the most basic statistical measure of quantitative
relationship, are a good starting point and are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Corruption and Explanatory Variables: Simple Correlations
Full Sample Last period Full Sample Last period
LOG(M/GDP) [openness] 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.14
LOG(GDP per capita) 0.66 0.68 0.75 0.82
Political Rights 0.58 0.65 0.60 0.63
Oil-Min Exports -0.25 -0.22 -0.19 -0.08
Remoteness -0.54 -0.52 -0.50 -0.52
LOG(AREA) -0.01 -0.01 -0.11 -0.15
Trade Liberalization Index - 0.16 - 0.35
LOG(Government Expenditure / GDP) * 0.49 0.55 0.44 0.47
ICRG 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.88
N. obs. 305 103 174 75
ICRG TI
* This variable is not available for all the observations included in the samples.
Although they do not give any indication on causality, correlations in Table  1
represent a first approximate test for the corruption theories we described and offer an
initial indication of the strength of the relationships. Openness, measured as a ratio of
imports on GDP, has a positive effect on corruption: our data show that countries with a
higher degree of openness will, on average, also record lower levels of corruption. The
same tendency applies, with stronger intensity, to the level of development. For each
corruption index, two correlation values are shown in the table where the first is
calculated using the full sample and the second using data from the last period only. In
general, countries showing stronger accountability, proxied by the political rights index,
lower sectoral concentration in their exports, lower geographic remoteness, smaller area,
larger government involvement in their economy, and a high degree of trade
liberalisation, also register low levels of corruption. Therefore in all cases but for the size
of the government (more on this below) the sign of the relationship corresponds to that
predicted by theories on the causes of corruption.
More interesting results derived from multivariate OLS regressions are presented
in Table 2. The parsimonious specifications in columns (1) and (1)’ indicate a positive
impact of openness on the quality of governance, in our case a reduced level of
corruption, for both samples.
Our regressions are in lin-log specification, meaning that the dependent variable,
corruption, is in linear format and the independent variables are in logarithmic format. InCD/DOC(2001)13
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this specification we can interpret the β s as the marginal effect on corruption of a change
in the logarithm of the dependent variable, or, as the marginal effect due to a relative
(percentage) change in the independent variable in linear format
8.
Using estimated coefficient from columns (1) and (1)′ , the most basic specification
of equation (1) predicts that a 10  per cent increase in imports openness results in
0.03-point change in the corruption score (0.34 x 0.1) in the ICRG sample, and in
0.06-point change (0.57 x 0.1) in the TI case. This is a sizeable effect, especially when
compared to the 0.09 and 0.17-point changes due to a 10 per cent increase in log GDP
per capita. Instead of an arbitrary 10 per cent change, it may in fact be more instructive
to consider more realistic variations in the independent variables such as their observed
standard deviations. This exercise results in a 0.18 reduction of corruption (0.34 x 0.53)
for the ICRG sample and a 0.31 reduction (0.57 x 0.54) for the TI sample.
To isolate the direct impact of openness on governance we need to consider other
important simultaneous determinants of corruption: columns (2) and (2)′  introduce these
additional controls to the basic specification.
Controlling for dependence on oil and mineral exports, for remoteness and size
does not change the overall picture. In these specifications a high explicative power is
achieved, even if not all the included variables are significant at conventional levels. The
basic results concerning openness and corruption are unchanged: the magnitude of
import openness changes slightly and the coefficients remain statistically significant.
Table 2. Globalisation and Corruption: OLS Results
Estimation (1) (2) (3) (4) (1)' (2)' (3)' (4)'
Dependent Var.
Regressors
C -4.22 3.74 1.34 -0.22 -12.67 -9.94 -11.26 -14.57
Log (M Openness) 0.34 0.38 0.55 0.51 0.57 0.53 0.60 0.45
2.33 2.48 2.21 1.98 2.72 2.53 2.06 1.33
Log (GDP per capita) 0.91 0.78 0.63 0.60 1.70 1.61 1.62 1.55
8.53 6.49 4.59 4.35 9.12 7.57 5.85 5.09
Pol.Rights 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.21 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.06
5.38 4.17 4.64 4.50 1.78 1.65 1.68 0.82
Oil-Min Exports -0.73 -0.13 -0.25 -0.78 0.18 0.41
-3.03 -0.36 -0.72 -1.65 0.19 0.58
Remotness -0.89 -0.60 -0.49 -0.22 -0.20 -0.02
-4.06 -1.89 -1.49 -0.83 -0.47 -0.04
Log(Area) 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.03
1.79 1.39 1.44 0.13 0.61 0.20
Trade Lib. Index -0.06 0.00
-0.84 0.02
LOG(Gov Expenditure / GDP)* 0.51 1.45
1.49 2.59
R2 0.49 0.55 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.70 0.73
Number of Obs 305 305 103 103 174 174 75 75
ICRG TI
Note: t statistics are shown in italics below the estimates
Interestingly enough, while for the ICRG case dependence on natural resources,
remoteness and, marginally, area turn out to be significant determinants of corruptionCD/DOC(2001)13
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levels, these same variables do not appear to reach statistical significance in the TI case.
Given a vast literature (among others, Tornell and Lane, 1998) pointing to higher rent-
seeking behaviour in natural resource abundant countries, and given that remoteness
and area should influence negatively corruption according to the theories described
above, one would expect these relationships to hold for both samples. Additionally, in the
TI case, openness records a much larger coefficient. These differences may originate for
two reasons: the first has to do with the samples. ICRG larger sample includes more
countries than TI’s and these additional countries produce the differences in the
regression results. The second source of difference may consist of variation in scoring
methods between ICRG and TI so that countries, similar in their levels of openness and
other explanatory variables, get different corruption evaluation by ICRG or TI. To check
for these two possibilities we restrict ICRG sample to include just TI’s countries and re-
run the regression in column (2). The results of this new regression (not displayed) show
that  ‘omitted’ countries do count; in particular, the restricted ICRG sample does not
include enough oil exporting countries to allow a significant estimation of their effect on
corruption, remoteness also loses significance due to the simple fact that the new
sample mainly includes large world exporters, i.e.  countries close to the economic
geographic centre. However, it should be finally noticed that, on a case by case basis,
some variations in scoring methods have been identified and that they certainly
contribute to the overall difference in the regression results across corruption indexes.
The last two columns in each panel of Table  2 introduce policy variables as
potential explanations of corruption. Columns (4) and (4)′  show how results vary when an
index of trade policy liberalisation and a measure of the extent of government
intervention, approximated by government consumption as a share of GDP, are
introduced. Notice that since these variables are available just for the last period,
columns (3) and (3)′  provide relevant comparable regressions. Basic findings are
unchanged: the openness coefficient is slightly reduced (especially in the TI case), and
trade liberalisation results insignificant for both ICRG and TI samples, whereas
government size turns out to be not significantly different from zero just in the TI case.
These results may at first appear surprising given the correlation indexes observed in
Table 1 above. However, protection as proxied by the liberalisation index is fairly low for
the most recent period we consider in our samples. Indeed, Gatti (1999) and Larrain and
Tavares (2000) examined the effects of average protection and its sectoral dispersion
and find very weak results confirming that trade protection may have some non-linear
effect that becomes significant only when trade barriers are above certain levels.
As far as government size is concerned, this additional variable seems to make
openness’ effect on corruption statistically insignificant in the TI sample. Various possible
explanations for this can be thought of. Firstly, the implicit endogeneity of government
size with corruption: on the one hand higher public officials’ salaries should discourage
corruption, on the other hand more pervasive state intervention in the markets may
create artificial rents and strong incentives for corruption
9. Additionally, government size
and openness are strongly correlated as shown by Rodrik (1998) and the introduction of
the former in our regression may clearly affect the coefficient for the latter. Once more, if
globalisation independently determines government size and corruption the coefficient of
government size is wrongly estimated due to endogeneity bias.CD/DOC(2001)13
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Recent empirical research on the causes of corruption and the quality of
governments (in particular Treisman, 2000 and La Porta et al. 1999) points out that a
further series cultural variables should be considered. In particular the roles of the ethnic
fractionalisation, of the colonial past, of the religious traditions, and that of long-term
stable democratic institutions are seen as important explanatory variables for the level of
corruption. In Table 3, we add these additional cultural controls to specification (2) of the
previous table.
Table 3. Additional Controls — Cultural Variables
Estimation (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2a)' (2b)' (2c)' (2d)' (2e)'
Dependent Var.
Regressors
C 2.00 1.97 3.39 1.64 0.26 -12.00 -11.78 -10.18 -11.17 -11.25
Log (M Openness) 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.54 0.52 0.53
2.83 2.83 2.54 2.19 2.63 2.48 2.49 2.60 2.57 2.60
Log (GDP) 0.92 0.92 0.77 0.89 0.70 1.84 1.84 1.58 1.48 1.46
5.86 5.81 4.89 5.11 3.86 9.02 8.68 7.36 7.03 6.53
Pol.Rights 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.03
3.70 3.61 2.80 1.93 1.42 1.76 1.73 1.48 0.45 0.40
Oil-Min Exports -0.72 -0.72 -0.78 -0.82 -0.76 -0.82 -0.85 -0.98 -0.93 -0.92
-2.69 -2.67 -3.06 -2.98 -2.81 -1.80 -1.85 -2.40 -2.18 -2.11
Remotness -0.90 -0.90 -0.87 -0.70 -0.37 -0.33 -0.37 -0.31 -0.07 -0.03
-4.07 -3.74 -3.99 -3.16 -1.87 -1.20 -1.21 -1.15 -0.26 -0.12
Log(area) 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
1.82 1.75 1.45 0.06 -0.48 0.59 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.56
Ethnic Fract. 0.73 0.73 0.41 0.76 0.71 1.62 1.62 1.23 0.78 0.80
1.67 1.66 0.89 1.57 1.44 3.25 3.23 2.45 1.48 1.50
Colonial Past -0.01 0.10 0.18 0.31 0.10 0.23 0.31 0.32
-0.05 0.39 0.71 1.32 0.23 0.58 0.82 0.84
Protestant 1.54 1.40 1.31 1.75 1.53 1.52
4.99 4.36 4.26 6.96 6.16 6.13
Democracy 0.75 0.65 1.10 1.10
2.82 2.54 3.62 3.60
OECD 1.17 0.14
3.44 0.38
R2 0.56 0.56 0.60 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.71 0.73 0.73
Number of Obs 287 287 287 240 240 171 171 171 168 168
ICRG TI
Note: t statistics are shown in italics below the estimates
Table  3 shows that the coefficients on “protestant” traditions, “democracy” and
“OECD” membership are significant and show the right sign, whereas “colonial past” is
not significant and “ethnic fractionalisation” is significant only for the TI sample but shows
a wrong sign
10; overall adding these controls increases the R-squared of the regressions.
Countries where protestant is the largest confession, where democracy has been
uninterrupted for the last 50 years, and that belong to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development record lower levels of corruption. Table 3 also shows that
the estimation of the effect of import openness on corruption is not strongly affected by
these historical variables; actually, their introduction slightly increases its explanatory
power. It seems that these variables, by lowering the explanatory power of the GDP and
political rights coefficients, are in fact accounting for deep institutional and social cross-
country differences.CD/DOC(2001)13
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It should be emphasised that these variables are all in dummy formats thereby
they are really just labels used to describe a, sometimes quite loose, common
characteristic of a particular group of countries. In fact the only proper label is the
“OECD” one: this group of countries adopted common measures to fight corruption and
is trying to enforce them through “peer pressure” mechanisms
11. Rather than testing
serious hypotheses on how, for instance, being a democracy may affect a country’s
corruption level, these dummies provide an indication that our corruption theories are still
incomplete.
A last important issue to be considered here is that of reverse causality. As
already pointed out, among the explanatory variables, Openness and GDP, at least, may
not be fully exogenous and in this case our estimates would be biased. Fortunately, by
identifying suitable variables (instruments) that are highly correlated with openness and
GDP but that do not directly influence corruption, standard econometric techniques allow
us to bypass this problem. Suitable is the crucial attribute here. This means that we need
new  theoretically  sound explanations for how openness and GDP are determined
independently of corruption. In what follows we firstly briefly discuss the instruments
selection issue, then comment on the results from specification tests and finally on the
endogeneity-corrected two stages least squares estimates.
A frequently used approach to instrument openness has its theoretical foundations
in the well-established gravity equation that links bilateral trade flows to distances from
major trading partners
12. According to this approach, a country degree of corruption-
independent openness increases with its proximity to the largest world traders, or if the
country’s official language is English. Conversely, the larger is the size of a country’s
domestic market, proxied by its population, the lower its openness.
The resurgence of economic geography in the late 1970s provides valuable
instruments for the GDP variable. A series of recent papers study the strong links
between geography and the level of economic development
13. They present empirical
evidence on positive correlation between GDP per capita and the absolute value of
latitude. They argue that lower development at the tropics may be caused by poorer
human health and by inferior productivity in agriculture. They also consider that winter
frosts in temperate regions may boost agriculture productivity and thereby development.
Geographical variables such as these are convincing instruments because their impact
on corruption could only result through their influence on GDP. The absolute value of
latitude, a dummy for tropical countries, and time dummies provide us with a valid
corruption-independent GDP instruments list
14.
In summary, Openness and GDP are the two possible endogenous variables, and
population, English speaking dummy, area, and remoteness (for M) and latitude, tropics
dummy, period dummies, and democracy (for GDP) are the eight potential instrumental
variables. A well-known drawback of instrumental variables procedures is that of
providing consistent but quite imprecise estimates when good instruments for the
endogenous variables cannot be found. Therefore the choice of instruments becomes
rather important; this can be performed in two complementary ways: through a test of
over-identifying restrictions (OID) or checking the relevance (i.e. explanatory power) of
the instruments. Based on these two criteria our final selection results in the following list
of instruments: tropics, population and time dummies; the other instruments have beenCD/DOC(2001)13
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excluded because they either exercise a direct effect on corruption (and not via the
suspected endogenous regressors) or their explanatory power is too low.
Once appropriate instruments have been selected, a proper endogeneity test on
Openness and GDP can be conducted. A Hausman-Wu specification test is used here
and its results reject endogeneity for both the ICRG and TI samples
15.
Given that the Hausman-Wu test is sensitive to the choice of instruments and in
order to provide final evidence on the independent influence of openness over corruption
that is comparable to that of other studies, we proceeded to estimate regression (2) of
Table 2 with a two-least squares method. Table 4 compares the results of the OLS and
IV estimations.
Table 4. Globalisation and Corruption: OLS and IV Results
Estimation (2) (2) IV (2)' (2)' IV
Dependent Var.
Regressors
C 3.74 0.78 -9.94 -6.95
Log (M Openness) 0.38 0.56 0.53 0.68
2.48 2.132 . 5 31.62
Log (GDP per capita) 0.78 0.92 1.61 1.43
6.49 3.34 7.57 2.60
Pol.Rights 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.12
4.172 . 0 51.65 1.00
Oil-Min Exports -0.73 -0.78 -0.78 -0.40
-3.03 -2.94 -1.65 -0.88
Remotness -0.89 -0.76 -0.22 -0.39
-4.06 -2.42 -0.83 -1.05
Log(Area) 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.00
1.79 2.02 0.13 -0.02
Trade Lib. Index
LOG(Gov Expenditure / GDP)*
R2 0.55 0.54 0.64 0.59
Number of Obs 305 305 174 174
ICRG TI
Note: t statistics are shown in italics below the estimates
Using instrumented variables (IV) in a rather parsimonious specification of
equation (1) slightly increases the magnitude of the estimated openness coefficients,
which remain significant at the 1 per cent threshold for the ICRG sample at the 10 per
cent for the TI sample. Even when potential reverse causality is accounted for, it clearly
appears that, because of reduced rent-seeking wasteful activities or due to their larger
investment in institution building, countries more exposed to international imports
experience a lower level of corruption.
In summary, our main empirical result, that the causal link from openness to
corruption is strong and statistically significant, is robust to the introduction of a whole set
of additional explanatory variables used in the literature on the causes of corruption, and
it is not affected by sample bias. Table 5 confirms that our results are in the broad range
of other studies’ estimations, providing further support to the thesis that corruption
declines in more open societies.CD/DOC(2001)13
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Table 5. Corruption and Openness — Comparative Results
Study: Larrain et al Gatti
Indipendent Variable: ICRG TI ICRG BI WCR BI TI ICRG
Dependent Variables:
β  Openness 0.34 0.57 1.08 0.62 0.9 1.28 1.6 0.2
β  GDP 0.91 1.70 1.21 2.44 0.5 1.47 1.25 1.12
β  Openess x StDev of Openness 0.18 0.31 0.74 0.56 0.92 0.82 0.93
β  GDP x StDev of GDP 1.03 1.82 1.28 1.67 0.23 1.54 1.95
Ours DiTella et al Wei
Note: estimations from most similar specifications have been used to compare these studies.CD/DOC(2001)13
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V. CONCLUSION
This paper showed how openness lowers corruption, a specific yet rather
important dimension of the globalisation and governance nexus. Microeconomic theory
helped identifying trade policy, competition by foreign producers and international
investors, and openness-related differences in institution building costs, as three major
transmission mechanisms through which openness affects a country’s corruption levels.
Examining a large sample of countries covering a 20-year long period, we found robust
empirical support for the fact that increases in openness do indeed cause reductions in
corruption. The magnitude of the effect is also quite strong. After controlling for many
cross-country differences, openness’ influence on corruption is close to one third of that
exercised by the level of development.
Confirming results by Gatti (1999) and Larrain and Tavares (2000), we were not
able to measure a significant direct effect from trade policy. We also found that, at least
for the TI sample, the addition of government size among our explanatory variables
decreases the magnitude of the openness effect and its statistical significance. Although
this does not invalidate our findings — openness in the ICRG sample is unaffected by
government size and it may as well be the case that this variable is caused by
corruption — some caution should be used when drawing economic policy implications.
Firstly, reducing trade barriers may not bring immediate positive corruption
reductions. It is true that in the long run, more open economies, enjoying more foreign
competition and investing abundantly in institution building, will register lower corruption
levels; however, in the short run, domestic policies may be more valuable than pursuing
globalisation at all costs. This may be especially important for poorer countries that may
face serious trade-offs between complying with international agreements and investing in
basic development infrastructures such as education, health, and social security.
Secondly, our support for a positive effect of globalisation onto governance is
based on a cross-section study, and it is well known that this type of analysis has several
problems. Cross-country differences in the levels of the dependent variables are the
central explanation for the variations in the dependent variable, and, no matter how many
controls are added, it will always be possible that some additional relevant variable is
missed or wrongly measured and that results are thus distorted. It is possible to account
for many local characteristics, yet comparing China to the USA, or India to Argentina, will
always be a bit stretched. This suggests that future research should focus on in-depth
country specific case studies. As in the case of Srinivasan and Baghwati (1999), who
examine the links between openness and growth, we are confident that the virtues of
outward orientation as quality enhancer for domestic institutions and growth will not be
refuted.CD/DOC(2001)13
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APPENDIX. EXTENDED RESULTS TABLES, COUNTRY LISTS, DATA SOURCES
AND DEFINITIONS
Table 6. Full ICRG and TI Country Samples
1980-85 & 1998-92 1995-98
Algeria Madagascar Argentina same countries plus
Angola Malawi Australia Bulgaria
Argentina Malaysia Austria Costa Rica
Australia Mali Bangladesh Cote d'Ivoire
Austria Malta Belgium El Salvador
Bahamas, The Mexico Bolivia Ghana
Bahrain Mongolia Brazil Guatemala
Bangladesh Morocco Cameroon Honduras
Belgium Mozambique Canada Iceland
Bolivia Myanmar Chile Jamaica
Brazil Netherlands China Luxembourg
Bulgaria New Zealand Colombia Malawi
Burkina Faso Nicaragua Czech Republic Mauritius
Cameroon Niger Denmark Morocco
Canada Nigeria Ecuador Nicaragua
Chile Norway Egypt, Arab Rep. Paraguay
China Oman Finland Peru
Colombia Pakistan France Romania
Congo, Dem. Rep. Panama Germany Singapore
Congo, Rep. Papua New Guinea Greece Slovak Republic
Costa Rica Paraguay Hong Kong, China Tanzania
Cote d'Ivoire Peru Hungary Turkey
Cyprus Philippines India Uruguay
Czech Republic Poland Indonesia
Denmark Portugal Ireland
Dominican Republic Qatar Israel
Ecuador Romania Italy
Egypt, Arab Rep. Saudi Arabia Japan
El Salvador Senegal Jordan
Ethiopia Sierra Leone Kenya
Finland Singapore Korea, Rep.
France Slovak Republic Malaysia
Gabon Somalia Mexico
Gambia, The South Africa Netherlands
Germany Spain New Zealand





Guyana Syrian Arab Republic Portugal
Haiti Taiwan, China Senegal
Honduras Tanzania South Africa
Hong Kong, China Thailand Spain
Hungary Togo Sweden
Iceland Trinidad and Tobago Switzerland
India Tunisia Taiwan, China
Indonesia Turkey Thailand
Iran, Islamic Rep. Uganda Tunisia
Iraq United Arab Emirates Uganda
Ireland United Kingdom United Kingdom
Israel United States United States
Italy Uruguay Venezuela, RB
Jamaica Venezuela, RB
Japan Yemen, Rep.






1984-89, 1990-94, & 1995-98
ICRG TICD/DOC(2001)13
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Table 7. Summary Statistics, ICRG and TI Samples 
a
 Observations  Mean  Std. Dev. StD / Mean  Maximum  Minimum
ICRG Corruption Index 281 5.79 2.25 0.39 10.00 0.00
Imports / GDP 281 35.02 22.27 0.64 181.03 6.29
Gross Private Capital Flows (GPKF) / GDP 281 9.55 16.48 1.72 160.35 0.03
GDP per capita
b 281 6,647.56 6,799.99 1.02 28,527.14 364.87
Political Rights 281 6.02 3.39 0.56 10.00 0.00
Government Expenditure / GDP 215 30.68 12.70 0.41 96.97 9.13
Government Consumption / GDP 215 15.36 5.88 0.38 48.06 4.36
Trade Liberalization Index 105 6.38 2.07 0.32 10.00 1.00
TI Corruption Index 164 5.10 2.66 0.52 9.65 0.00
Imports / GDP 164 31.58 18.17 0.58 151.19 6.21
Gross Private Capital Flows (GPKF) / GDP 164 10.13 14.20 1.40 92.95 0.13
GDP per capita
b 164 8,547.20 7,172.52 0.84 28,527.14 463.06
Political Rights 164 7.03 3.14 0.45 10.00 0.00
Government Expenditure / GDP 124 31.39 11.58 0.37 62.73 12.27
Government Consumption / GDP 124 15.51 5.54 0.36 38.27 3.65
Trade Liberalization Index 75 6.32 1.89 0.30 10.00 1.00
Note:
  a) All variables are averages of the three periods considered by ICRG (1984-88, 1990-94, 1995-98) and TI (1980-85,
1988-92, and 1995-98); except for the Trade Liberalisation Index which is available only for the third most recent period.; 
b
GDP is measured in thousands of USD at PPP exchange rates.
Table 8. Cultural Variables (For ICRG sample)
Groups Never Colony Protest Democracy OECD
Members: Austria Bahamas, The Australia Australia
Belgium Denmark Austria Austria
China Finland Belgium Belgium
Denmark Germany Canada Canada
Ethiopia Iceland Costa Rica Czech Republic
Finland Jamaica Denmark Denmark
France Netherlands Finland Finland
Germany New Zealand France France
Hungary Norway Germany Germany
Iran, Islamic Rep. Papua N. Guinea Iceland Greece
Ireland South Africa India Hungary
Italy Sweden Ireland Iceland
Japan Switzerland Israel Ireland
Netherlands United States Italy Italy
Portugal Luxembourg Japan
Spain Netherlands Korea, Rep.
Sweden New Zealand Luxembourg
Switzerland Nigeria Mexico
Thailand Sweden Netherlands
Turkey Switzerland New Zealand
United Kingdom United Kingdom Norway











Group Members 6.3 8.2 8.1 7.9
Non Members 5.3 5.2 5.2 4.8
M - Openness
Group Members 33.6 38.9 36.7 35.2
N o n  M e m b e r s 3 2 . 93 2 . 63 0 . 03 2 . 7
GDP
Group Members 12476.2 17604.0 19420.3 18257.3
Non Members 6675.9 7400.3 6519.7 5170.3CD/DOC(2001)13
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VARIABLES SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS
Governance — Quality of Institutions
ICRG — Definition: Perceived corruption in Government INDEX. Unit: 0 to 6,
higher scores denoting lower corruption levels. The original index has been re-scaled
into a 0 to 10 scale. Coverage: yearly observation for 1984-00 (140 countries). Source:
International Credit Risk Guide, 2000
TI — Definition: Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Unit:
0 to 10, ten representing a perceived level of negligible bribery, while zero indicating very
high levels of bribery. Coverage: 1980-85 average, 1988-92 average, 1995-00 yearly
data (99  countries). Source: Transparency International (www.transparency.de) and
Göttingen University (www.uni-goettingen.de/~uwvw).
Globalisation — Openness
M  —  Definition: Imports of goods and services as percentage of GDP. Unit:
percentage.  Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) CD
ROM, 2000.
LIB — Definition: IMF’s Trade Restrictiveness Index. Unit: 1 to 10, higher scores
denoting less open trade regimes. The original index has been re-scaled so that higher
values denote more open trade regimes. Coverage: yearly observation for 1997-00
(140 countries). Source: IMF.
Additional Controls
GDP — Definition: Gross domestic product per capita. Unit: current international
US$ PPP. Source: Global Development Finance and WDI.
POLR — Definition: Freedom House’s Political Rights index. Unit: ranging from
1 to 7, higher values denoting absence of political rights. The original index has been
inverted and re-scaled into a 0 to 10 scale, lower values denoting absence of political
rights. Source: Freedom House (http://freedomhouse.org).
OILMIN  —  Definition: Dummy for countries heavily dependent on fuel and
mineral exports. Takes the value of one if the combined share of “fuel exports” (as
percentage of merchandise exports) and “ores and metals exports” (as percentage ofCD/DOC(2001)13
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merchandise exports) is greater than 50 per cent. Unit: 0-1 dummy. Source: export data
from WDI (2000).
ETHNIC FRAC — Definition: Ethnic fractionalisation index, ranging from 0 to 1
(combination of various measures of fractionalisation). Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
GOVEXP — Definition: Consolidated Central Government total expenditure as
percentage of GDP. Unit: percentage. Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics CD
ROM (2000).
COLONIAL PAST — Definition: Dummy for “ever a colony” countries (OECD founder
countries are excluded). Unit: 0-1 dummy. Source: Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project,
Dr. Paul R. Hensel, homepage at http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~phensel/icow.html
PROTESTANT  —  Definition: Dummy for countries where Protestant religion
accounts for more than one third of the population. Unit: 0-1 dummy, one denoting
protestant countries. Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
DEMOCRACY  —  Definition: Dummy for democratic countries in all 48  years
between 1950 and 1998. Unit: 0-1 dummy. Source: Treisman. (2000).
OECD ENGL —  Definition: Dummy for OECD member countries. Unit: 0-1
dummy. Source: OECD website.
Instruments
DISTANCE  —  Definition: Bilateral distances. Unit: Km. Source:
http://www.eiit.org/Trade.Resources/TradeData.html#Gravity
EXPORT Shares — Definition: Export of goods and services as a share of world
export of goods and services. Source: WDI (2000).
LATITUDE  —  Definition: Distance from the Equator. Unit: degrees. Source:
Easterly database.
TROPICS— Definition: Dummy for tropical countries if absolute value of latitude
is less than or equal to 23. Unit: 0-1 dummy.
ENGL — Definition: Dummy for English speaking countries. Unit: 0-1 dummy.
Source: La Porta et al. (1998).CD/DOC(2001)13
33
NOTES
1. In a companion paper, Braga de Macedo (2001) emphasises the implications of better governance
for institutional change in developing countries.
2. For an interesting look at the Wagner’s Law, see Easterly and Rebelo (1994).
3. For a sceptical survey of the literature, see Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) and papers cited therein.
4. The propositions in the text are illustrated by Figures 2 to 4 in Braga de Macedo (2001), which are
based on the data set used in this paper.
5. For a recent survey see Aron (2000) and for an interesting approach to the causality issue see
Acemoglu et al. (2000).
6. Using readily available measures of openness and GDP per capita in a standard ordinary least
squares estimation would produce biased coefficients.
7. Since population is highly correlated to import openness, the logarithm of land area is a better















9. Notice that the variable “government consumption” includes public wages and salaries, and that it is
notoriously difficult to have uniform and good quality data on public finance variables across
countries.
10. However the effect of ethnic fractionalisation on corruption is not clear. While recent investigations
indicate high fractionalisation as a negative determinant of growth, studies focusing on the causes of
corruption do not find such a clear-cut result. Gatti (1999), for instance, finds that fractionalisation is
significant and reducing corruption. This finding is explained in terms of the increased difficulties
bureaucrats encounter in extracting bribes from ethnic groups they do not belong to.
11. This is elaborated in Braga de Macedo (2001). In appendix, we show the countries forming the
groups of “never a colony”,  “protestant”,  “democracy”,  “OECD” and their group averages for M-
Openness, GDP, and corruption indices.
12. The gravity model micro-foundations are found in Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Deardorff
(1998).
13. Hall and Jones (1999), Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999), Engermann and Sokoloff (1997), Bloom
and Sachs (1998), Masters and McMillian (2000), Sachs (2000), Masters and Wiebe (2000), and
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000).
14. Time dummies provide indispensable time dependent variables.
15. We carried out two types of tests: on the one hand, we checked for endogeneity of both variables and
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